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ABSTRACT
Drones (also known as 'Unmanned Aerial Vehicles' - UAVs) are a potential source of evidence in a
digital investigation, partly due to their increasing popularity in our society. However, existing
UAV / drone forensics generally rely on conventional digital forensic investigation guidelines such as
those of ACPO and NIST, which may not be entirely fit-for-purpose. In this paper, we identify the
challenges associated with UAV / drone forensics. We then explore and evaluate existing forensic
guidelines, in terms of their effectiveness for UAV / drone forensic investigations. Next, we present
our set of guidelines for UAV / drone investigations. Finally, we demonstrate how the proposed
guidelines can be used to guide a drone forensic investigation using the DJI Phantom 3 drone as a
case study.
Keywords: Drone forensics, UAV forensics, forensic challenges, forensic guideline, forensic case
study

1.

INTRODUCTION

Drones, also referred to as 'Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles' (UAVs) in the literature, can be
loosely defined as an aircraft piloted by remote
control or an on-board computer. There are a
wide range of UAVs, in terms of capabilities and

prices. Such U AVs are also designed for use in
different environments, such as security,
disaster response (e.g. rescue missions) ,
mapping, and adversarial settings (e.g.
battlefields).

1

Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this paper in order to describe
an experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply
recommendation or endorsement by the authors or their institutions, nor is it intended to imply that the
entities, materials, or equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose.
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U AV s can be considered as part of the
broader Unmanned Aerial System (UAS), which
encompasses UAV, Ground Control Station
(GCS) and Controller. These parts are
necessary to successfully, remotely and
accurately control a UAV.

Technology (NIST) published the 'Guidelines
on Mobile Device Forensics [11] '; Existing UAV
forensic approaches are generally based on
ACPO and NIST guidelines (or their variations).
This is not surprising, as there is no published
guideline designed for UAV forensics.

In recent years, UAVs have been
increasingly popular among consumers and the
research community. For example, the global
market revenue for drones is expected to surpass
$11.2 billion by the year 2020, according to a
report from Gartner [1]. With so many drones
purchased for home and personal use, the
potential for drones to be involved in a digital
(forensic)
investigation will undoubtedly
increase. For example, it was posited that
vulnerabilities in driverless vehicles may be
exploited by criminals, particularly terrorists, to
facilitate criminal or terrorist attacks in the
physical world [2]. The same can be said for
drones [7] .

Hence, in this research, we review existing
(U AV) forensic literature and potential data
storage locations. In our review, we highlight
the limitations in existing guidelines, and the
need for a guideline dedicated to U AV forensics.
Thus, we propose in this paper a forensic process
focused on U AV investigations. This process is
designed to guide the investigation process when
examining U AV s.

U AV forensics is relatively less studied, in
comparison to other popular consumer devices
and technologies such as mobile devices (e.g.
Android, iOS , and Windows Phones) , cloud
computing, edge computing, and fog computing
[25].
In 2015, Kovar [3] highlighted the essential
elements akin to U AV forensics and detailed the
process of obtaining data from the popular DJI
Phantom 2. A year later in 2016 , Kovar,
Dominguez and Murphy [4] extended the prior
work in [3] to include a forensic examination of
a DJI Phantom 3. Along a similar line, Horsman
[5] conducted a forensic investigation of Parrot
Bebop UAV, and Clark et al. [8] presented their
findings of a Phantom 3 U AV forensic
examination.
On the other hand, more than a decade ago
in 2007, the Association of Chief Police Officers
(ACPO) published 'The ACPO principles for
obtaining digital evidence [10] .' In the same
year, the National Institute for Science and

Page 56

We then evaluate the proposed process
using a drone as a case study, and specifically a
DJI Phantom 3 drone.
The rest of this paper is structured as
follows: in the next section, we discuss U AV
forensic challenges and briefly review existing
forensic guidelines in the context of U AV
forensics. We present our U AV forensic process
in Section 3, and the case study in Section 4.
We conclude and discuss future work in Section
5.

2.

UAV FORENSIC
CHALLENGES

U AV forensic and security examinations have
been undertaken by U AV enthusiasts and the
fan communities. For example, a number of
them have created their own (often freely
available) software, which can interpret the
data files stored on the U AVs. One such
example is DatCon, a tool designed to interpret
.DAT files specifically from DJI UAVs [9].
While these tools are a valuable pool of
knowledge, such tools are unlikely to have been
validated according to forensic requirements. In
other words, these tools are unlikely to be
forensically sound and artifacts obtained from
using such tools may be inadmissible in a court
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of law. Thus, there is a need for forensic
validation work to be undertaken by the digital
forensic community.
In addition to the diversity / variation in
UAV products, it is understandable that the
existing forensic examination guidelines may
not be appropriate or sufficient. For instance,
the ACPO principles for obtaining digital
evidence [10] and NIST Guidelines for mobile
phone forensics [11] were both published in
2007, and these guidelines may not have kept
pace with technological advances.
In the context of UAVs or UAS, for
example, data can be stored in several locations,
such as the UAV, GCS, network routers, and so
on. Storage locations can also be overt or covert,
and one also needs to note that in some
instances, there are in-built persistent storage
media such as Micro SD cards [12]. There is also
the likelihood of the recovery of artifacts from
flash storage, which typically require some form
of direct connection [24]. We would also have to
take into consideration the likelihood that a
U AV used in a criminal activity has been
modified to either hinder forensic investigation
or enhance certain features such as increased
load carrying capacity (e.g. in drug smuggling
activities across borders, or act as an improvised
explosive device).
As previously discussed, there are a number
of existing digital forensic guidelines. When the
ACPO principles [10] were created, it was an
attempt to standardise what was then a
relatively new field of forensic study. The four
ACPO principles were generalised so that they
are technologically neutral. However, it is
important to note the key concept underpinning
these principles is to ensure the integrity of the
original data. This clearly applies to UAV and
any forms of digital forensics.
There are also similarities between UAV and
mobile device forensics [26]. For example,
similar to a mobile device, a modern or
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advanced GCS is likely to have Wi-Fi,
Bluetooth, or Internet connection. Therefore,
there is a possibility that the device could be
remotely wiped or modified. UAV forensics can
also involve conventional storage media
forensics [24] (e.g. memory cards are copied) and
live forensics (e.g. real-time access to a live UAV
to view data stored on flash memory). Since
most U AVs do not have a graphical user
interface (GUI) or inbuilt interface, there is a
real-risk that data may have been changed
without the knowledge of the forensic
examiner / investigator. Thus, consideration
must be given at this level of examination, and
while deciding the order of investigation one
needs to minimise any potential for data
modification. Since checking of U AV flash
memory requires a live interaction, it is unlikely
that any two examinations will achieve the same
result.
Whilst existing literature is useful to guide
a general forensic investigation of a UAV,
having a UAV focused / specific forensic process
could
be
more
useful
to
forensic
examiners/ investigators (e.g. to maintain
consistency across cases).

3.

PROPOSED UAV
FORENSIC
INVESTIGATION
PROCESS

In this section, we first determine if there are
any differences between digital storage
locations, when compared to traditional
computer/ mobile forensics. Next, we propose a
new forensic investigation process for UAV.

3 .1

UAV data. storage location

In many ways, the storage locations for UAVs
share similarities with mobile devices. UAV
storage locations vary, but the medium used to
store data is primarily either a Micro SD card
or flash memory. This seems to be an over
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simplification given the constant evolution and
advances in related technologies. For example,
older mobile devices relied upon flash storage for
operating system (OS) storage and Micro SD
cards for additional storage. Since 2015, most
mobile devices use flash storage. Given the
demand for UAVs to become more efficient, it
seems likely that they will follow a similar
technological trend to mobile devices.
At the time of this research, popular
commercial U AVs provide OS via flash storage
or Micro SD card, with a separate Micro SD
card for video footage. This flexibility allows the
base UAV cost to remain low, whilst allowing
upgrades to storage at the owner's expense.
Since there is demand for U AVs to remain in
flight for longer periods of time, and to provide
increased 4K support for video capture, the
likelihood that flash storage will become an
option (similar to Apple's graded internal
storage pricing) becomes more likely.
A more significant variance between U AV s
and mobile devices is the inherent adaptability
and modular nature of UAVs. UAVs can store
data in different locations such as the U AV,
GCS, and other mobile devices used to
connect / pilot the UAVs. Flight log data is often
stored in a single location; however, media files
are often found in multiple locations , usually in
different resolutions.
Investigation on the data obtained from
mobile devices , laptops and personal computers
usually incorporate elements of registration
information, such as email addresses, usernames
and payment plans. Since UAVs traditionally
do not require registration or payment plans
[13], this further dilutes the association between
the device and the operator.

3. 2

Proposed process

Now we describe our UAV forensic
investigation process step-by-step, using a case
study for illustration. In our process, there are
three main stages, namely: preparation,
Page 58
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examination and analysis/ report. The first stage
includes Steps 1 to 6. Steps 7 to 17 are part of
the second stage, and the final stage includes
Steps 18 to 20.
Step 1 - Identify and determine the chain of
command
Relevant
follows:
1.

2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

questions to consider are

as

How is the exhibit seized? For example ,
has
a
tamperproof
evidential
container / bag been used, and have
photographs been taken of the exhibit?
Has consideration been given to
electronically isolating the exhibit (e.g.
the use of Faraday box/ cage)?
Does the container state the exhibit
reference?
Does the container name the seizing
officer or exhibitor?
Does the container have a unique
reference number?
Does the container state when and
where the exhibit was seized?
Does the container have sufficient space
to sign your name?

The above questions are not an exhaustive
list of considerations and should be adapted
based on the situation, and the guidelines and
rules of the investigation authority. As with any
forensic examination, if the credibility of the
exhibit cannot be maintained, its evidential
usefulness will become limited. If the exhibit
continuity is weak, then it creates an element of
doubt in the admissibility of the evidence and a
potential for the defence team to discredit part
or all of the evidence obtained.
It is often the case that the UAV will be
seized first (e.g. due to device failure or pilot
error). Should data relevant to the case be
obtained , there may be a lag between when the
U AV was seized and when the warrant or arrest
was executed. Should a GCS be found during
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the search process, it will need to be examined
to determine if it is linked to the UAV.
Due to the inherent remote access associated
with UAVs, consideration must be given to
network isolation. It may be safer, cheaper and
more practical to switch off the U AV at the
point of seizure. However, since there does not
appear to be a standard OS across the wide
range of U AVs, consideration must be given to
how data is stored and what effect this will
have.
Step 2 - Have conventional forensic
practices (e.g . DNA , fingerprints, and ballistic)
already been implemented?

Digital evidence can also be supported by
traditional evidence such as witness statements.
For example, fingerprints and other DNA
materials found on a U AV can also be used as
supporting evidence in the investigation.
Step 3-Identify the role of the device
conducting the offence (Offence analysis)

in

This step includes two important tasks,
namely: (i) Review the case investigation notes
to determine how and why this device was used
during the commission of the offence; and (ii)
Identify what the offence was and how it is
alleged that the U AV was used.
In other words, we need to recover artifacts
to support the elements of proof, and thus focus
our forensic investigation accordingly. For
example, if it was alleged that a drone was used
during a voyeurism offence, then the drone's
video footage, etc may be more useful evidence
than flight logs.
Step

4 - Photographs

During
any
digital
examination,
photographs
should
be
taken.
These
photographs may help to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the exhibit was in the
condition described during the notes. Device
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images should be taken which present the
following:
Exhibit within the tamperproof container.
The tamperproof container, including
exhibit reference, unique seal number, etc.
Exhibit out of the tamperproof container.
Exhibit from all possible angles.
Any markings or serial numbers.
Any obvious modification.
Any damage(s).
BIOS, if possible (and this can be performed
later during examination, when data storage
media has been removed).
Load carrying mechanism, if applicable.
Defensive/ offensive capability, if applicable.
During the examination, the device BIOS
data may be obtained. When images are taken,
these should also contain a digital radio clock
with the current date and time. Photographs
should be taken to accurately portray any load
carrying mechanism (where one can be
identified). Also, if defensive or offensive
capability
has
been
identified,
then
consideration should be given to the safety of
the examiner and sufficient precautions be made
to prevent any injury. The list of photographs
which should be taken is not exhaustive. In
principle, photographs should be taken of any
relevant aspect of the exhibit that may prove
evidential, either in supporting or refuting the
supporting evidential material or assumptions.
Step 5 - Identify the make and model

At this step, identification should be via a
visual inspection, taking into account markings,
designs and patterns, and cross referencing.
Such identification can be facilitated through
experience and open source researching.
Identification can help the investigation in a
number of different ways. If the device has a

Page 59

CDFSL Proceedings 2018
high value, then consideration should be given
to whether or not it is a stolen device.
Using local law enforcement resources, it
may be possible to create a short list of recent
thefts and burglaries where a U AV was stolen.
Should a suspect already have been identified
for the theft , then this may present investigative
avenues to help identify the UAV operator.
Whilst this step is not entirely unique to
U AV forensics , it is likely to be far more
common. Computers and mobile devices are
usually seized from an address or individual,
however U AV s are more likely to be seized when
the operator is not nearby or at a crime scene,
as such attribution becomes more difficult.

Step 6 - Open source investigation to
identify device characteristics, potential data
storage locations, and available forensic/ nonforensic tools
Device characteristics: Identify if a device is
genuine or a counterfeit by identifying the
markings, light locations and any other
significant feature(s) and comparing such
information against the specifications of the
product as listed on the manufacture website.
Potential data storage locations: Whilst
some memory card locations will be clearly
marked and easily accessible, some may not.
Some devices have removable storage, whilst
others may have inbuilt flash memory.
Understanding the potential locations for data
storage will allow one to plan the forensic
examination and reduce the possibility of
missing evidence.
Available forensic / non-forensic tools: Many
of the analysis tools which will be used, will
likely have been created by drone enthusiasts.
There are currently only a few U AV-specific
commercial forensic tools available (e.g.
Cellebrite and MSAB); however, their portfolio
of models catered for is limited.
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This step is not entirely unique to U AV
forensics but given the limited forensic literature
available in this field, it is a key feature.
There is no standard location or format for
U AV flight data, and research is necessary to
prevent missing evidence or misinterpreting
extracted data.

Step 7 - Identify capabilities (Video/ Audio
recording, carrying capacity and technique)
The following two steps are arguably the
first stages which are entirely unique to U AV
forensics , when compared to other forms of
digital forensics. The reason being that, for
example, most commercially available U AVs are
not designed to carry payloads and release
them. Commercially sold UAVs are 'currently'
not designed to hold a firearm or offensive
weapon.
Since U AV investigations will likely be
related to a criminal offence, it becomes more
crucial to determine how the U AV was used and
what (if anything) was adapted to allow the
U AV to carry out the offence.
It is unlikely that one would detail and
highlight modifications to a desktop computer
or a mobile device, since neither are historically
used beyond what they were designed to do.

In this step, investigators aim to answer the
following questions:

•
•
•
•
•

Does the device have a video capture
facility (see Figure la)?
Does the device have an audio capture
facility?
Does the device have a load carrying
capacity (see Figure 1b)?
Does the device have an offensive
capability (see Figure le)?
Does the device have a defensive
capability?

It is recommended that one conducts a
visual examination of the device and takes note
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of each of its capabilities, as well as taking
photographs
where
appropriate.
Where
offensive or counter-offensive capabilities are
noted, consideration must be given to minimise
health and safety risks to the examiner, and
appropriate safeguards should be put in place.
A criminal investigation can change direction,
based on new information uncovered.
Step 8 - Identify potential modifications.
The
standard
drone
specifications
(depending on the drone) are sufficient for the
task they were designed to complete. The use of
U AV s in the commission of some criminal
offences may require modifications to the UAVs,
as previously discussed.
Thus, identifying such modifications will
help support an investigation to either confirm
or refute the alleged use during the offence. An
example could be the sending of items into a
restricted area (e.g. prison). Most standard
drones do not have a load carrying mechanism.
Due to flight time restrictions, the drone may
have a non- standard battery (to increase flight
time). The drone may also have non-standard
motors to reduce noise levels.

(a)

UAV with a camera (HD camera fitted o a DJI Mn-ic Pro).

(b)

UAV load canying (lma.ge !hows a DJI Pbmtom, where a
rod of plastic has been taped spanning the legs. A ming can
be seen hanging do, rn, which would ha\·e held the payload).

(c)

UA with an offc11Sn-e capability (Image mows a custombuilt UAV with a 9mm pistol attached to the frame, which
was bken fro a ,,id!!O !hol>ing the pmol firing whilst _
UA was airborne).

Figure 1. Identify capabilities

Items of interest include non-standard
battery, non-standard motors, non-standard
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propellers, non-standard
carrying device.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Forensic ...
camera,

and load

Identifying the standard characteristics of a
U AV can prove tricky, since not all
manufactures list all of the parts present.
Consideration should then be given to either
contacting the manufacturer directly and/ or
expanding the sources of information to include
enthusiast forums and similar websites.
Step 9 - Identify data storage locations.
Relevant data storage locations in a U AV
include removable memory card (SD , Micro SD,
etc.), fixed memory card, flash memory (NAND,
NOR, etc.) , and SIM card.
Drone data storage locations can vary
considerably, and in some cases, data can also
spread over multiple locations. Some drones will
capture media and store the original version on
the drone, whilst also streaming a reduced
quality version onto a storage device (e.g.
mobile device or the cloud). Some drones will
have visible slots, which are designed to allow
easy access and swapping of portable storage
devices (memory cards). Often these will be the
default storage location for media. Some drone
models will have hidden and potentially sealed
portable storage devices (memory cards). Often
these will be the default locations for system
information and potentially flight logs.
Below are two drone models with modelspecific storage capabilities:
The DJI Phantom 4 has two removable data
storage locations on the drone. The first
contains media data, whilst the second contains
flight log data (including ancillary data such as
motor speeds) [14].
The Yuneec Typhon H has one data storage
location on the drone, which contains media
data [15]. The flight log data is stored on the
dedicated GCS [16].
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Step 10 - Identify ports
There are a variety of different methods that
can be utilized to enable interaction with a
drone, and external ports appear to be the most
common method used by manufacturers.
External ports such as USB (2.0/ 3.0), USB-C ,
Micro USB and Lighting can potentially allow
access to a drone's data storage, where storage
is considered to be either flash or fixed.
Consideration should be given to conducting
this type of examination, as it will likely involve
powering on the exhibit. Any examination of
this type will require an understanding of the
drone systems, as data will likely change.
Should evidence be obtained, the examiner
will need to be able to explain what data
changed during the examination, and why the
evidence obtained during the examination can
be relied upon.
Step 11 - Extract removable data storage
mediums
In this step, we recommend the use of nondestructive methods. Consideration at this stage
should be to extract only data sources that do
not require destructive methods (e.g. chip-off).
Destructive methods should only be considered
when all other methods fail. As with any
forensic examination, notes must be made to
identify where removable storage devices were
taken from. These storage devices will then need
to be sub-exhibited in accordance with the
naming conventions stated by the examiners
force.
Step
12
Preserve
evidence
Clone/ forensic copy of storage medium
This is a common practice in many digital
forensic examinations, as such the process will
not be explained in this document. It should be
noted that cloning a removable storage medium
may be beneficial when attempting to access
data which may otherwise be unobtainable.
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By way of an example, the DJI Phantom 4
flight logs are stored in .DAT files. These are
normally classed as 'Generic data files,' but
unlike most file types, they do not have an
associated software to read them. When a new
flight log is opened, it also has the secondary
effect of closing the previous .DAT file. The last
flight log is not viewable until the device is
turned on.
By cloning the removable storage device, the
examiner is then able to replace the memory
card with the cloned memory card, power on the
device; thereby, closing the final .DAT file, and
ultimately re-examining the memory card which
now has the last recorded flight data (last
recorded prior to seizure). Original data has not
been changed, but new data has now become
viewable.

Step 13 - Traditional interrogation of
storage medium - use certified forensic tools
This is a common practice in many digital
forensic examinations. It should be noted that
traditional forensic tools may successfully
extract media files; however, flight logs may
show as 'unreadable.' UAV manufacturers may
store data in different formats , and currently
there is no standardisation. Should any data be
identified, consideration must be given to
checking the data though another tool and
confirming that it has been interpreted
correctly.

Step 14 - Extended interrogation of storage
medium
This step is somewhat unique to UAV
forensics. Typical digital forensic analysis is
normally conducted using commercial forensic
tool, which will usually have a proven record for
accuracy. Any examination using non-validated
tools is considered a risk. However, until
commercial forensic tools for all U AVs are
available, we may have little choice but to rely
on open source tools to extract data of forensic
interest.
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As previously discussed, the capabilities of
such open source tools can vary significantly. In
some cases, extracted data can provide
significant information, whilst others may only
provide limited data. Examples of such tools
include DatCon (Primarily DJI) [9], DJIFix
(carves images and videos through the
command line) [17], st2dash [18], and
DroneLogbook [19]. There are both advantages
and disadvantages in the use of such tools:
Advantages

•

•

•
•
•
•
•
•

If the U AV stores data in a format that
is supported by existing tools, then the
open source tool can often interpret data
that may not be understood using
existing tools.
Tool is also freely available, although
one should note the software fair usage
restrictions.
Most makes and models are supported
(with varying success).
Disadvantages
The data obtained is unverified,
incomplete or corrupted.
Tool updates are sporadic or nonexistent.
Previously available tool may be
removed without warning.
Increased risk of obtaining malware.

When considering potentially non-validated
open source tools, validation of results will prove
necessary [23].

Step 15 - Interrogation of the UA V/ Drone Potentially using a clone of any storage medium
identified
In certain circumstances, it may not be
possible to remove storage devices, such as
embedded multimedia card (eMMC) storage.
Prior to conducting destructive examination
techniques (chip-off, etc.), consideration should
be given to performing live examination of the
device.
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The most common connection is via direct
cable and this will likely be the case for the
immediate future. For example, advances in
mobile technology and digital forensic tools may
result in other remote ways of obtaining
evidence from U AVs. One should be open and
research for potential connection methods
appropriate to the U AV in question.
There may also be product specific software
available that supports device examination;
however, consideration should always be given
to the validity and forensic soundness of the
tool.

Step 16 - Interrogation of peripheral devices:
flight controller, mobile device, etc.
Streaming data techniques and cloud
storage means that data may no longer be
stored on the physical device (beyond system
and function files). Thus, consideration should
also be given to ancillary devices that may be
used to control the device and/ or store data.
Most drones require a GCS in some form,
which can take the form of a dedicated GCS
(handset), mobile device (phone, tablet etc.),
laptop, or potentially a computer that could
input flight paths without the need for later
remote access, which could perform autonomous
flight.
This step becomes more specific to U AV
forensics , since it could be considered that
UAVs form part of the overall exhibit , which is
the Unmanned Aerial System (UAS). We do
not consider a mobile device to have
independent components, nor a computer;
however, the media consistently refer to a UAV
(or Drone), but never the U AS, as such this
stage is significant .
The examination of such devices could be
conducted
using
known
forensic
tools
(Cellebrite, MSAB, etc.), but this process may
only be limited to mobile phones and tablets
which are usually supported.
Equally,
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computers could be examined using tools such
as EnCase or X-Ways.
The larger issue arises if the forensic tool
does not understand or cannot interpret the
file( s) holding the required data. Whilst this
guide focuses on UAV examination, steps 6, 10,
11 , 12 and 14 would also support GCS
examination.
When considering GCS in the form of
mobile phones and tablets, we also have to
consider applications, since this would be the
likely platform used to interact with the UAV.
Whilst further work around peripheral devices
would clearly support and enhance this guide,
at this stage there are too many variables (due
to a lack of standardization) to include.

Step 17 - Extract removable data storage
mediums (Destructive)
Destructive extraction methods such as
chip-off should be considered a final resort for
obtaining data from a digital storage device.
Should this extraction method fail, the
likelihood of obtaining useful evidence will be
significantly reduced unless another method
becomes available at a later date.
From the authors' experience, it would
appear that the preferred storage medium for
U AVs is a micro SD card. However, if the U AV
follows the same technological curve as mobile
phones, this could be replaced with an eMMC.
At that time destructive methods may become
more likely unless the U AV / Drones being
examined are supported by tools available at the
time of examination.

Step 18 - Initial review of extracted data
Analysis largely depends on the offence
under investigation and the elements of proof
required. For example, image and video
metadata may hold file creation times and
dates, along with GPS data. Interestingly, due
to the often-hidden location of data storage
locations, suspects may fail to remove previous
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data prior to committing offences. For example,
our personal experiences have shown that often
the first images stored on the device are images
of the suspect playing with the device and
learning how the recording function works.
Flight data can also vary dramatically with
some recording little or no data, whilst others
will record GPS position (including altitude),
individual motor speed, pitch and yew and a
whole host of details and photographs. For
example, flight logs generated through
examinations of DJI U AVs (using the DatCon
analysis software) showed significant detail,
including motor speeds and battery usage.
Conversely, flight logs generated through
examinations of the DJI GO application on a
tablet (using Cellebrite software) showed much
less data.
Step 19 - Interpreting and translating of
data - Into a human readable and evidential
format
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through an examination. For example, where
flight log data has been extracted and
extrapolated, consideration should be given to
providing a visual representation of the location.
Whilst many options are available, often a
simple
mapping
software
will
suffice.
Consideration should also be given in relation to
unnecessary information.
It should also be noted that while the
guidelines flow sequentially, each part can, or
possibly, should be considered as independent,
and can be conducted at any point in an
examination as required.

4.

A CASE STUDY

In this section, we demonstrate how our forensic
process presented in Section 4 can be used to
guide the forensic investigation of a DJI
Phantom 3 UAV (see Figure 2).

Digital examinations can, and often do,
produce a significant amount of data. There are
three main aspects to this step, which can be
broadly categorised as data sifting, data
confirmation and data translating:

•

•

•

Data sifting is the process of reducing
the data obtained through examination,
to only case relevant data.
Data confirmation is the process of
verifying the obtained data and
confirming its accuracy.
Data translation is the process of
changing often complex data sets into a
human readable format.

Step 20 - Report/ Statement
A sound report can have a significant
influence on the likelihood of a conviction
and/ or sentencing. Specifically, a well-written
report should focus on the facts of an
examination and its conclusion should be an
impartial assessment of the data obtained
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Figure 2. DJI Phantom 3

Since the experiment was designed to
evaluate the process of obtaining data, rather
than analysing the data extracted, the
examination notes do not contain personal data
relating to the U AV (or where data is
represented, it is edited). No report will be
generated which contain flight logs.
As this is a used case exhibit, we will skip
the requirement for a sealed tamperproof
property bag. There was also no recorded
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information regarding seizure details or other
non-digital forensic investigation (e.g. DNA,
fingerprints or ballistic).
Based on our online research, we determined
that the DJI Phantom series has a removable
memory card within the camera, and a separate
memory card fixed to the motherboard. The
camera memory card usually stores media
(images and videos), the motherboard memory
card usually stores flight logs. Our online
research also suggested that flight logs can be
viewed using open source tools such as DatCon.
We were also not concerned with gathering
artifacts to support the elements of proof in this
evaluation; hence, the omission of relevant
steps.
This study will use EnCase (Version
7.12.01), which has been validated under
ISO / IEC 17025.
As part of our examination, we determined
that
the
exhibit
has
the
following
characteristics:
1. Device:
• Model - W322B (DJI Phantom 3
Adv)
• QR code - P*****l 7***** J
2. Battery:
• Model - PH3-4480mAh-15.2V
3. ID / reference number - 6***********2
4. Video capture facility - No
5. Audio capture facility - No
6. Load carrying capacity - Yes
7. Offensive capability - No
8. Defensive capability - No
9. Is there visible damage to the device? Yes, one propeller is broken along with
minor damage to the propeller arm.
10. Based on the standard fittings (as per
the manufacturer's website), does
anything appear to be missing? - Yes,
normally there is a camera mounted on
the base of the device; however, this
appears to have been removed. The
Page 66
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mounting point and cables remain,
indicating that it was once attached.
11. Exhibit measurements:
• 380mm by 380mm
12. Identified modifications (where possible,
when compared with factory default
options):
• Non-standard battery - No (as
listed on the DJI website)
• Non-standard motors - No (when
visually compared on the DJI
website)
• Non-standard propellers - No
(when visually compared on the
DJI website)
• Non-standard camera - Standard
camera removed, no camera
present.
• Load carrying device - What
appears to be fishing wire, tired
between the landing struts, with
a large amount remaining. The
remaining amount could be used
to carry a payload.
13. Identified digital storage (see Figure 3):
• External memory card - Not
present - Normally present but
removed with the camera.
• Internal memory card - 4GB
SanDisk Micro SD card.

Figure 3. UAV's digital storage
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14. Identified Ports:
• Micro USB
15. Peripheral devices:
• No other devices submitted.
16. Internal 4GB Micro SD Card removed.
17. EOl created using EnCase - Complet e.
Hashes match and this also revealed no
bad sectors. Carving using EnCase Complete. EnCase used to view data
within .DAT files. Files contain dates
but no other legible data (see Figure 4).
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18. DatCon 2.4.0 used to interpret flight log
data -Complete (see Figure 5) .
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Figure 5. Interpret flight log data

Flight log data obtained , which
contained dat es, GPS locations, etc.
19. The final .DAT file (FLY104.DAT)
contained dat a, but it could not be
viewed using DatCon. Our online
research suggested that the file was not
closed correctly, and that the DJI
Phantom 3 does not close a .DAT file
until it is required to open another.
20. EnCase was then used to clone Micro SD
Card, and the cloned Micro SD Card
was placed in the U AV. The U AV was
first turned ON , and then turned OFF .
The cloned Micro SD card was
viewed using EnCase. The final .DAT
file was extracted and viewed using
DatCon successfully. All relevant dat a
were extracted.
Micro SD card was placed back into
the case exhibit.
21. After using DatCon, two files were
created, namely:
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•

FLY104.csv
contained
a
spreadsheet (Viewable in Excel)
listing all the flight record data.
Notably
this
spreadsheet
contained GPS data, battery
capacity and height.
• FLY104.kml, when combined
with Google Earth, plots the
route of the UAV.
When
properly set up, one should be
presented with an accurate flight
path.
22. The summary of data obtained after
analysis and its relevance to an
investigation are as follows.
The UAV has minor damage, which
includes damage to one of the four
propellers. This would indicate that the
device suffered damage on impact and
would support the assertion that it was
in flight immediately prior to the crash.
The device had been modified by the
removal of the camera and the addition
of a load carrying mechanism. The
removal of the camera also meant that
the memory card (located in the camera
mount) , which normally contains media,
was not present.
The removal of the camera could
also be an indication that the user
wished to minimise the likelihood of
attribution or reduce weight in order to
allow a larger payload.
The addition of a load carrying
mechanism indicates that the device had
been adapted specifically to carry a
payload. Thus, it would support the
assertion that the device was being used
to carry a payload prior to its crash.
The retrieved flight logs contained
the final flight, along with previous
flight logs. The previous flight logs
could
contain
evidentially
useful
information, which could include the
home address of the user, along with
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friends and associates. Previous flight
logs could also contain historical
offenses.

5.

CONCLUSION AND
FUTURE-WORK

U AV s will play an increasingly important role
in future digital (forensic) investigations, as
such devices become more sophisticated and
their usage become more common in our society.
In this paper, we presented a UAV focussed
forensic investigation process, and used it to
guide the investigation of the DJI Phantom 3
drone.
Future research will include extending the
work in this paper to forensically examine other
UAV models and makes, and possibly obtain a
taxonomy of forensic artifacts that can be
recovered from such devices (similar to the
approach of Afzar et al. [20][21][22]). We also
look at the possibility of adapting the proposed
process in the vehicle forensics [27].
As previously discussed, one limitation m
U AV forensics is the lack of validated
forensically sound tools; hence, this is another
potential research direction. For example, the
next logical step would be to create some form
of parsing tool that could analyse original data
and provide a readable and reliable result.
Besides, UAV could be integrated with radio
communication services in the future. Hence,
forensic acquisition and analysis of artifacts
from radio-communication services [28] can also
be explored.
Finally, anti-U AV forensics is also another
potential topic of research interest. We need to
understand the types of activities and their
effectiveness that may be undertaken by cybercriminals to counter forensic investigations.
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